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Abstract
We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects
with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract
involves a high interest rate but nearly zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This
contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral haz-
ard (two effort levels), the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts,
one with high interest and zero self-financing, and a second with a lower interest plus
co-financing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy,
observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The
gains vary with the size of the externalities, cost of public funds, and effectiveness of
the private VC industry.
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1 Introduction
Innovation, and the knowledge externalities it generates, is the primary source of
economic growth. These externalities are central to policy debates over how best to
promote sustained growth and competitiveness.1 Accordingly, governments around
the world invest large amounts of public resources to support private sector R&D,
through direct support (loans/grants), tax subsidies, and schemes targeting high-
technology startups. In the U.S., for example, total government support for private
R&D was about $36.6 billion in 2014, or 11.5% of private R&D. About two-thirds of
this funding was in the form of direct support, the remainder as tax subsidies.2
In this paper we use mechanism design methods to study the optimal struc-
ture of government loans for R&D startups and to show how the optimal design de-
pends on key features of the economic environment. Our approach is motivated by
the following key observation. Government funds are socially costly, so to the extent
possible, governments should confine their support to startups that generate a suf-
ficiently large positive externality. However, not all high externality projects should
be supported. Those with sufficiently high probabilities of success will be supported
anyway by the private market which cares only about the expected private return,
and those with sufficiently low success probabilities are not worthy of support. This
implies that the government should focus on projects that generate a large externality
and have an intermediate probability of success. In this sense, the optimal govern-
ment policy needs to ‘target the middle.’3
In order to analyze the optimal design of R&D loan programs, we develop a sta-
tic model in which risk neutral entrepreneurs have risky projects that generate posi-
tive externalities. Entrepreneurs have limited internal funds to finance their projects,
and face a competitive private venture capital market which provides both finance
and ‘advice and network connections’ that enhance a project’s probability of success.
In order to focus on externalities, we simplify the description of the private finance
market by assuming that venture capital firms are able to solve the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems, so that they know the success probability of projects.4
1There is an extensive empirical literature documenting that R&D spillovers are large and pervasive,
and thus that the market generates underinvestment in innovation – confirmed by the fact that the
social rate of return to R&D is much larger than the private return. For an early review see Griliches
(1992). For a recent study of both positive spillovers and negative business stealing effects from R&D,
see Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) who show that the social rate of return to R&D is
much larger than the private return.
2See OECD (2019), “R&D Tax Incentives: United States,” www.oecd.org/sto/rd-tax-stats -united-
states.pdf
3This paper focuses on R&D spillovers as the main economic justifiation for government support.
Another possible reason is capital market imperfections. There is empirical evidence that cash flow
constraints affect capital and R&D investment. The classic reference is Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1989). For a more recent review, see Hall and Lerner (2010).
4In practice, VC firms use sophisticated, contingent contracts to overcome this informational asym-
metry, but this is outside the scope of our model.
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The risk neutral government, however, does not have any information about these
probabilities.
In our model, R&D projects are characterised by three features: a probability
of success, private returns and an externality. Both the success probability and social
returns vary across projects; for simplicity, we assume private returns to be common
to all projects but this restriction is relaxed later.
We assume that the government has an unbiased signal of the social returns and
has two instruments at its disposal: the interest rate on the loan and a co-financing
(matching funds) requirement.5 Specifically, the government supports projects in the
following way. When an entrepreneur applies for a loan, the government obtains an
unbiased signal about the externality of the project, and offers a menu of loan con-
tracts to the entrepreneur, which are repaid upon success. The entrepreneur chooses
one contract from the menu. The menu consists of pairs of an interest rate and a self-
financing requirement, conditional on the size of the project externality. A loan with an
interest rate equal to minus one is akin to a grant. Matching-loan schemes are used by
many countries, but our specification has the additional feature that the co-payment
requirement is allowed to depend on the externality generated by the project.6
Two core objectives shape the design of the optimal R&D loan policy. The first
is to minimise redundancy, i.e., to not support projects that would anyway be funded
by the private sector because public funds are costly. The second is to maximise the
‘additionality’ of government funding, i.e., ensure that entrepreneurs implement all,
and only, those projects that generate positive expected social returns. The first ob-
jective requires that high probability projects be screened out. The second requires
that very risky projects also be excluded because their expected social returns will not
justify undertaking them. One would like to design support policies that are both ad-
ditional and non-redundant. However, for reasons we will explain later, the optimal
policy may not always maximise additionality or minimise redundancy. This implies
that policy design, and ex post evaluation of existing schemes, should not be based
exclusively on just one of these criteria.
For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneur may apply for financing from the
private market or from the government, but not from both. We first derive the welfare
maximising policy with adverse selection, where projects differ in terms of risk, but
without moral hazard – i.e., project success probabilities are exogenous. We show that
the optimal policy approximates ‘first-best’ efficiency and involves selecting exactly
those projects that are socially profitable but will not be financed by the capital market.
The optimal contract is to set the interest rate as close as possible to the ex post
rate of return of the project with the highest probability of success that would still not
be supported by the private market, together with a co-financing rate that approxi-
5In practice, government loan programs for R&D startups vary along three main dimensions:
whether grants or loans are used, the interest rate charged in the case of loans, and the co-financing
requirements from the applicant for both grants and loans.
6As will become clear in the theoretical analysis, the menu of loan contracts we study is equivalent
to a menu of equity contracts, where the government’s equity share depends on the project externality,
plus a co-payment requirement.
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mates zero. Using a high interest rate –in the limit, the ex post rate of return – reduces
redundancy. The low co-financing requirement increases the set of projects applying
for government support, which increases additionality. Under this optimal policy, the
entrepreneur bears (almost) no risk in the event the project fails. We call this policy
the ‘zero liability contract.’
It is worth noting that this contract design differs sharply from the typical R&D
loan schemes observed in the real world, which have significant co-financing require-
ments but zero or negative interest rates (for more information, see https://rio.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/en). The optimal policy is also very different from the commonly ob-
served pure grant schemes (equivalent to a loan with an interest rate of minus 100%).
When we introduce moral hazard into the model, allowing the entrepreneur to
choose between two effort levels, the optimal policy potentially changes sharply. We
show that the optimal policy consists of at most two contracts: one is the zero liability
contract, which is the same as in the case with no moral hazard; the other is charac-
terised by a lower interest rate in order to provide incentives to the entrepreneur to
undertake effort, together with a higher co-financing requirement. We call this policy
the maximum outlay contract.
An alternative way to promote innovation by startups and other small firms,
which some governments have adopted, is to provide a subsidy to private venture
capital firms (Hellman and Schure, 2010). While the focus of our paper is the design
of an optimal loan policy, we also derive the optimal venture capital subsidy pol-
icy and compare it to the optimal loan policy in simulations of the model. A direct
government loan policy has both advantages and disadvantages relative to a venture
capital subsidy. The main advantage is that the government selects projects taking
into account the externalities they generate, whereas private venture capital firms do
not. On the other hand, VC firms are assumed to have better information on riskiness
of projects as compared to government. In addition, VC firms not only provide fi-
nance but also advisory services and network connection that increase the probability
of project success. These trade-offs imply that the choice between a government R&D
loan policy and support for private venture capital finance will depend on the size of
project externalities and the effectiveness of the venture capital sector, both of which
are likely to vary across countries and perhaps also across sectors.
We simulate the model, using parameters calibrated from various data sources,
to illustrate how the optimal government R&D loan policy varies with three key para-
meters: the cost of public funds, the size of project externalities, and the effectiveness
of VCs in enhancing project success. We also assess the welfare gains from using the
optimal policy, relative to policies commonly observed in practice, and to the alter-
native of an optimal direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. We find that the
optimal R&D loan policy generates significant welfare gains relative to the private
market alone and relative to observed loan policies. The direct VC subsidy can give a
higher welfare gain per dollar of government expenditure than the optimal loan pol-
icy, but only in those cases where the optimal loan is the maximum outlay contract.
The key policy message is that the optimal approach to government support for R&D
start-ups depends on these three features of the economic environment. As such, our
analysis and simulations show that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not appropriate.
3
From a theoretical perspective, the problem we analyze is a mechanism design
problem with type-dependent participation constraints and moral hazard.7 Three fea-
tures of the optimal loan policy we develop are worth noting. First, the optimal solu-
tion is ‘simple’ in the sense that it consists of at most two alternatives (at most one for
each level of induced effort, two in our model), even though there is a continuum of
types. This is unusual in the mechanism design literature.8 The feature that generates
this simplified mechanism is that the optimal policy involves ‘targeting the middle’:
the high types (projects with high probability of success) will be funded by the private
market and the low types do not justify public financing because their expected social
gains are negative. We show that if a given type prefers one government loan over
another, then so do all higher types. Because of the incentive compatibility constraint,
offering another contract to the higher type involves leaving more rent to the entre-
preneur and there is no social payoff to doing that.9 Second, we also show that, under
a mild restriction which is empirically relevant, the optimal policy actually consists of
only one contract. Whether it is the zero liability or maximum outlay contract depends
on parameter values, in particular the size of the project externality and the cost of
public funds. Third, our conclusion that the optimal solution consists of at most two
contracts is robust to the introduction of two-dimensional uncertainty, where there is
both asymmetric information about the project probability of success and the private
return when successful. We are not aware of any examples in the mechanism design
literature for which this is the case.
1.1 Related Literature
Two recent papers study the impact of using direct grants and indirect fiscal instru-
ments to support innovation. First, applying regression discontinuity analysis, How-
ell (2017) shows that seed grants from the Small Business Innovation Research Pro-
gram in the United States significantly improve the chances of small high-technology
companies to secure venture capital funding and enhance their subsequent perfor-
7Myerson (1982) introduced and proved the Revelation Principle for generalized principal-agent
problems with a privately informed agent. Julien (2000) applies these results to monopolistic and
competitive nonlinear pricing.
8The optimal mechanism in our model is a single (linear) contract for each effort level. Laffont and
Tirole (1986) provide an early example of mechanism design with adverse selection and moral hazard
that generates a menu of linear incentive contracts. For discussion of ‘simple’ mechanisms and how
to achieve them, see Hurwicz (1973), Wilson (1985), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), and Bergemann and
Morris (2005).
9This intuition is analogous to the one that underlies the famous “no-haggling" result in monopoly
pricing that implies the optimality of menus with a single contract (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Zeck-
hauser, 1983). Samuelson (1984) and, more recently, Bergemann et al. (2018) applied a similar intuition
to explain why in the presence of an additional constraint, the optimal menu may consist of up to two
contracts. Here, the additional constraint ensures that the second contract induces full effort from some
entrepreneurs’ types (note that there is no need to require that the first contract induces partial effort,
which would introduce yet another constraint, because an entrepreneur who exerts no effort cannot
get any government support anyway).
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mance. In a very different type of analysis, Acemoglu et al. (2018) develop and
estimate a macroeconomic model of firm-level innovation and productivity growth
that incorporates heterogeneous firms and entry and exit, and then use it to simu-
late various counterfactual fiscal policies. Among other results, they show that an
optimal R&D subsidy (equivalent to 39% of R&D) generates a 1.22% welfare gain. In
their framework, the subsidy induces adverse selection effects on incumbent firms
and entrants. When expressed in comparable terms, our simulations imply that the
optimal R&D loan policy generates somewhat larger welfare gains – between 1.73%
and 2.42%. Our optimal R&D loan policy is based on a mechanism that is designed to
avoid negative selection effects and maximize welfare. Given that our optimal policy
is targeted in this way, larger welfare gains are to be expected.
These two papers differ from ours in their objective and approach. However,
our paper is related to Howell (2017) and others in that we focus on direct instru-
ments to foster innovation (loans and grants) in a partial equilibrium framework, and
to recent macroeconomic models such as Acemoglu et al. (2018) in that we offer a
quantitative welfare evaluation of government R&D support policies. These stud-
ies, including ours, highlight the importance of assessing the innovation and welfare
effects of different policy instruments.
A number of empirical studies, some based on survey data and others adopt-
ing more formal econometric methods, have analysed the ‘additionality’ of existing
R&D subsidies and loan schemes. These include Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen
(2013 and 2017) who develop structural models of R&D to estimate the welfare ef-
fects of R&D subsidies. Non-structural econometric studies include Busom (2000),
Klette, Moen and Griliches (2000), Wallsten (2000), Lach (2002), and Gonzalez, Jau-
mandreu and Pazo (2005). Most of these studies find evidence of additionality from
government subsidies, but they also reveal substantial variation in the degree of ad-
ditionality across programs.10 This naturally raises the question of how the design
of support programs affects additionality and, more generally, how loan (and grant)
programs should be structured to maximise welfare.
To our knowledge, there is almost no research that addresses this important
question. One recent, closely related paper by Akcigit, Hanley and Stantcheva (2016)
studies the optimal design of R&D subsidies and corporate taxation as a dynamic
mechanism design with asymmetric information and externalities. However, the set-
ting and the focus of their paper is very different from ours, in part because they study
different instruments and do not incorporate a role for private venture capital financ-
ing. We view our paper as complementary to theirs, and part of a broader research
agenda that focuses on the design of R&D policies rather than evaluating existing
programs.
Our analysis of the optimal design of R&D loan policy is set in the context of a
private VC market which constitutes the alternative source of funding for entrepre-
neurs’ R&D projects. In modelling the VC market (in Section 2.2), we draw on a rich
theoretical and empirical literature on the role venture capital firms play and how they
10For general discussion of additionality, see OECD (2006).
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structure contracts to minimise the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
(Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2002, 2004; for a review of the
literature, see Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri, 2012). Among other things, this literature
emphasises that VC firms provide more than just finance; they also provide ‘advice’
and a network of connections that enhance the probability of success of the start-up
projects they support, and this is reflected in the price entrepreneurs pay for VC af-
filiation (Hellman and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2005). In addition, the literature emphasises
the dynamic structure of contracts – in particular, the use of contingent, performance-
based cash flow rights, control rights and governance structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the
model with the private venture capital market. In Section 3 we derive the optimal pol-
icy when there is adverse selection but no moral hazard. Section 4 introduces moral
hazard, and shows that this materially changes the structure of the optimal policy. We
also briefly discuss extensions to the model. Section 5 presents the optimal venture
capital subsidy and characterizes its properties. In Section 6 we present simulations
to assess the welfare performance of different policies against the benchmark of the
optimal policy with moral hazard and to compare the optimal loan policy to the opti-
mal venture capital subsidy. We conclude with a brief summary and implications for
policy. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix (additional computational details and
tables are in a series of online appendices).
2 Model
2.1 Definitions and Assumptions
We consider a model where a risk neutral government faces a large number of risk
neutral entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur has a project that generates both private
and social benefits, and the government has to determine whether and how to support
these projects.
An entrepreneur’s project is characterised by a pair (p, s)where p is the project’s
probability of success as explained below, and s is the (non-negative) externality it
generates. A successful project generates a commonly known (private) return R >
1.11 If the project fails, the private return and social contribution are both zero. The
cost of the project is normalized to 1; it is assumed to be commonly known. We de-
compose this cost into two additive components: cI is the cost of developing the idea
and prototype for the project (‘inspiration’) and cp is the cost of further development
(‘perspiration’) that enhances the project’s probability of success but is not necessary
for the project to succeed.
The parameter p 2 [0, 1] denotes the project’s probability of success if the en-
trepreneur exerts ‘full effort’ at cost cI + cP  1. If the entrepreneur only exerts the
11The assumption that R is commonly known is relaxed in Section 4.2.1. It simplifies the analysis but
does not affect our main results.
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‘partial effort’ cI , then the project’s probability of success is kp for some k 2 [0, 1].
Entrepreneurs have funds b  1 of their own. We assume that they are able to fi-
nance the first (inspiration) stage of the project on their own, i.e., cI  b. If b < 1,
an entrepreneur cannot complete the project without partial funding by a VC or the
government in the amount of 1  b.
If the entrepreneur is funded and advised by a venture capitalist, the project’s
probability of success is scaled up by a factor of β  1 or 1p , whichever is smaller, pro-
vided the entrepreneur exerts full effort.12 It is assumed that this enhancement does
not apply if the entrepreneur only exerts partial effort. The probability of success of
an entrepreneur who is funded by the government and exerts full effort is p. We as-
sume that the probability p is known by the entrepreneur and observable to VCs, but
not to the government. Since agents are risk neutral, this is equivalent to allowing the
project’s p to be drawn from a distribution whose mean is known by the entrepreneur
and VCs.
We distinguish between two cases: one where the entrepreneur’s effort cP is
observable to the VCs and the government, and the other where it is not. If cP is ob-
servable, there is no moral hazard. We analyze this simpler case in Section 3. The case
where cP is unobservable involves moral hazard. One way this can arise is that the
entrepreneur may choose to divert the external funds she receives and not exert the
additional effort cP. The severity of the moral hazard problem facing the entrepreneur
is increasing in k because a higher k makes the option of exerting partial effort more
attractive. We analyze this more realistic case in Section 4.
For most of the analysis, we impose no restriction on the relationship between k
and cI . But in the simulations section, we focus on the case where k = cI to simplify
the analysis. When k = cI , the percentage increase in cost in moving from partial to
full effort is equal to the percentage increase in the associated probability of success.
We call this ‘constant returns to effort’.
Finally, we assume that the government observes a signal about the externality
from the project, σ 2 [0,∞), which we normalize to be such that σ  E [sjσ].13 Because
σ provides the best estimate of the unobserved s and the government is risk neutral,
no loss of generality is involved by simply replacing s by σ below. Thus, we assume
that a project is characterised by a pair (p, σ) instead of (p, s), and that the government
believes that p and σ are drawn from a commonly known joint distribution, which we
write as Fσ(p). In the model we do not make any assumptions about the correlation
between p and σ, so the correlation between expected private and total social returns,
pR and p(R+ σ), is unrestricted.
12Thus, the probability of success of projects with a small p is multiplied by β, and that of projects
with a larger p, for which βp  1, increases to 1.
13Since only the (risk neutral) government cares about these externalities anyway, our model is for-
mally equivalent to one in which the public returns of projects, if successful, are publicly known.
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2.2 The Venture Capital Market
Our primary objective is to study the optimal design of government loan policies for
R&D, not the VC market. But we want to place the analysis in the context of a styl-
ised depiction of the alternative private financing opportunities entrepreneurs face.
For this purpose, we adopt a simplified characterisation of the venture capital mar-
ket. Since our model is static, we cannot capture the dynamic features of contingent
contracting that are observed in the VC industry. However, we incorporate two im-
portant characteristics of observed venture capital markets.
First, we assume that the advice and networks VC’s provide (in addition to cap-
ital funds) enhance the probability of success of supported projects. Second, we as-
sume that VC firms provide capital in return for an equity stake in the project, which
is realised if the project succeeds. As we show below, the equity stake will vary across
projects and depend on their probability of success, because competition among VC’s
drives expected profits to zero.14
Finally, we assume that VC firms know the probability of success for each project.
In other words, we assume, for purposes of simplification, that the contractual provi-
sions the VC firms actually use (but which we do not model here) work effectively to
solve the VC’s adverse selection problem. While we recognise that this description of
the VC market is highly stylised, it allows us to focus on the optimal design of public
support under the information constraints the government faces.
In our setup, from a welfare perspective, the VC market has two advantages
over the government loan. First, VC firms have an informational advantage in that
they are assumed to know the probability of success for each project, which is un-
known to the government. Second, VC involvement enhances the success probability
by providing technical, marketing advice and network connections. On the other
hand, the government has the advantage of taking into account the externality gen-
erated by the project. Since they are profit maximising, VC firms do not factor this
externality into their evaluation of potential projects.
As mentioned already, we assume entrepreneurs have internal funds in the
amount b, where cI  b  1, so they are able to finance the first (inspiration) stage
of the project on their own. In addition, they have access to a perfectly competitive
venture capital market in which they can obtain financial support of 1  b that allows
them to complete the development and commercialisation of the project. In addition,
the VC increases the project’s probability of success from kp (with partial effort) to
min(βp, 1)with full effort. The parameter β captures the effectiveness of the VC in its
advisory and networking role.
The VC assesses the success probability p, and asks for an equity share α(p)
that ensures it can break even on its investment, provided the entrepreneur exerts full
14Note two points. First, in practice, VC firms charge for their management services through a per-
centage levy per dollar of capital invested (typically 2%) for each round of financing. We can easily
incorporate this fee into the model, but it does not change any of our results. For simplicity, we drop it
from the analysis. Second, the value of the equity stake from the successful projects (after repayment
of initial capital invested) is shared by the venture capital managers and the investors who fund the
VC, but this plays no role in our model.
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effort. If the project succeeds, the payoff to the VC is α(p)R; if it fails, the return to the
project is zero and the VC and entrepreneur do not recoup their costs.
Since the VC market is competitive, the zero expected profit condition is
α (p)min(βp, 1)R  (1+ $)(1  b¯) = 0
where $ is the risk-adjusted normal rate of return, which we normalize to zero. It
follows that the zero-profit equity share for the project is
α (p) =
1  b
min(pβ, 1)R
.
Because the VC cannot take an equity stake greater than one, it will refuse to support
projects whose p < 1 bβR on which it cannot break even, even if it has right to the entire
return of the project.
Observe that the VC would only invest in a project if the entrepreneur is induced
to exert full effort. This is because, given the equity stake α (p) , a VC would lose
money on its investment if it lends 1  b to an entrepreneur who is not induced to
exert full effort.15,16
This analysis yields the following moral hazard constraint:
min(βp, 1)(1  α(p))R+

1  b

  1  kp(1  α(p))R+

1  b

  cI .
The left hand side is the expected payoff to the entrepreneur from exerting full effort: a
project is successful with probability min(βp, 1) and generates a return (1  α(p))R to
the entrepreneur; the sum 1  b is obtained from the VC; and 1 is the entrepreneur’s
cost of full effort. The right hand side is similar except for the fact that, with partial
effort, the probability of success decreases to kp and the cost of the entrepreneur’s
effort decreases to cI . The moral hazard constraint simplifies to
p  1  cI
R(β  k) +
1  b
βR
15Of course, since the VC observes p, it could offer a different equity stake to entrepreneurs who
exert partial effort. While the VC cannot directly observe effort, it can compute the critical value p
above which the entrepreneur would exert full effort. It could offer funding of 1  b in exchange for
the zero-profit equity stake α(p) for p  p and funding of cI with a different α(p) for p < p that
allows it to break even on those projects. However, the entrepreneur exerting partial effort does not
require VC support since cI  b, and she would be indifferent to taking the offer or using her own
funds. We assume that in cases of indifference she self-finances.
16For simplicity, we assume that the VC does not enhance the probability of success unless the en-
trepreneur exerts full effort. However, even if β > 1 with partial effort, the qualitative analysis is
unaffected as long as the entrepreneur’s payoff function remains increasing and convex in p. This will
hold as long as the value of β is larger when the entrepreneur exerts full effort than with partial effort
(this follows from the definition of UP(p) below).
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for projects with p < 1β . When p  1β , the moral hazard constraint is satisfied if
R  1  b¯ + 1 cI1 k . We assume that this inequality holds. As explained in the simu-
lation section, the calibrated value of R based on observed data easily satisfies this
constraint. This inequality also ensures that α(p)  1.
In addition, it is important to note that VCs would only lend to projects with
nonnegative expected value, i.e., βpR   1  0 or equivalently p  1βR . An entre-
preneur with a lower p would not be interested in a loan if it intends to exert full
effort. For simplicity, we assume that any project that satisfies the moral hazard con-
straint also generates a nonnegative expected value with full effort. This requires that
1
βR  1 cIR(β k) + 1 bβR or equivalently β(1  b  cI) + bk  0. Given the calibrated para-
meters we use (based on various data sources; Appendix A for details), this inequality
is easily satisfied.17
An entrepreneur who is denied VC support can still develop the project on her
own with partial effort and obtain expected payoff kpR  cI . An entrepreneur prefers
taking VC funding with an equity stake of 1  α(p) and exerting full effort, to devel-
oping the project on her own with only partial effort, if and only if:
min(pβ, 1)(1  α(p))R+

1  b

  1  kpR  cI .
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality is satisfied if p satisfies the moral
hazard constraint.
Summarising these results, the following proposition characterises the set of
projects that are developed without government intervention.
Proposition 1. (Sorting in the Private Market) Entrepreneurs of type p 2 0, cIkR abandon
their projects. Entrepreneurs of type p 2
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

develop their projects on their
own and exert only partial effort. However, if 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR <
cI
kR then entrepreneurs of type
p 2
h
0, 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR

abandon their projects. Entrepreneurs of type p 2
h
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR , 1
i
develop their projects with VC funding of size 1  b, for which they grant the VC an equity
stake α(p). These entrepreneurs exert full effort.
Denote the payoff to the entrepreneur from developing its project by UP(p).
Using the formula above for the equity stake α(p), Proposition 1 implies that UP is
17The model can also be solved without this assumption. However, we would need to distinguish
between the two cases. We prefer not to do it because this would complicate the analysis without
adding any important insights.
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given by18
UP(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if p 2 0, cIkR
kpR  cI if p 2
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

minfβp, 1gR  1 if p 2
h
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR , 1
i
This analysis shows that, absent government intervention, entrepreneurs with
p < 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR will not be able to obtain financing for their projects from the private
market and these projects are either abandoned or only implemented with partial ef-
fort. Entrepreneurs with p < cIkR would not want to develop their projects on their
own even with partial effort. However, to the extent that some of these projects in-
crease social welfare, the government would be interested in helping to fund them.
In addition, some of the projects with p 2
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

, which are only imple-
mented with partial effort, may also increase social welfare and warrant government
support to induce full effort.
The VC model presented in this section is obviously very stylised, though we
think it captures some basic features that are observed in the real world. Its role is
simply to provide a reasonable description of the private market within which to ana-
lyze the design of government support of start-ups and conduct simulations, which is
our main focus. It is worth noting, however, that any model of the private market that
induces convex expected payoffs – such that entrepreneurs with small p’s drop their
projects, those with intermediate p’s implement their projects but exert only partial
effort, and those with large p’s implement their projects and exert full effort – would
deliver similar results as far as the analysis of government support is concerned.
2.3 Government Funding
We assume that the government supports projects in the following way. When an en-
trepreneur applies for a loan, the government obtains a signal σ about the externality
of the project, and offers a menu of conditional loan contracts to the entrepreneur of
1  bσ at interest rate rσ. Each conditional loan enables the entrepreneur to implement
the project, and she chooses (at most) one of the conditional loan contracts offered. An
entrepreneur who selects a loan of size 1  bσ needs to raise an amount bσ from her
own or borrowed funds. We restrict attention to cases where bσ  b¯. We emphasize
that our specification has the feature that the co-payment requirement bσ and interest
18However, if 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR <
cI
kR then
UP(p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p 2
h
0, 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR

minfβp, 1gR  1 if p 2
h
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR , 1
i
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rate rσ are allowed to depend on the externality generated by the project, σ. As we
show below, the optimal menu consists of at most one pair (bσ, rσ) for each level of
induced effort. For notational simplicity, in what follows we omit the subscript σ.19
The cost of public funds is 1+ λ where λ  0. In what follows, we refer to λ as
the shadow price of public funds. Consider a project (p, σ) that receives government
support in the form of a loan of size B at interest rate r  RB   1 (this inequality ensures
the entrepreneur can pay back the loan to the government if the project succeeds),
and where the entrepreneur exerts full effort. This project generates expected social
welfare
W (p, σ, b, r) = p (R+ σ)  1  λ (1  b) (1  p (1+ r)) . (1)
With probability 1  p the project fails, generates no return, and costs b+ (1  b)(1+
λ). With probability p the project is successful, and generates a social return of R+ σ,
at a cost b + (1  b)(1+ λ)   λ(1  b)(1+ r). Note that, if the project succeeds, the
social cost λ(1  b)(1+ r) is offset by the entrepreneur’s payback and is not incurred.
In expectation, this yields the expression in (1). If the entrepreneur takes the loan but
only exerts partial effort, the expression is similar except that p is replaced by kp, and
 1 is replaced by  cI .
The expected social welfare of a project in which the entrepreneur exerts full
effort with VC support, but without a government loan, is
W (p, σ) = min(βp, 1) (R+ σ)  1 (2)
If the entrepreneur receives no support from either a VC or the government and exerts
only partial effort, then the probability of success is kp and the cost of effort is cI so
expected social welfare is20
W (p, σ) = kp (R+ σ)  cI (3)
Entrepreneurs who can obtain VC support, or who would develop their project
on their own with partial effort, may nevertheless accept a government loan. When
this happens, the government loan does not generate additional innovation. In this
case, government support of these projects is ‘redundant’ because the set of projects
being implemented and the effort exerted by entrepreneurs is not changed by the
support program. The only exception is when the entrepreneur would have exerted
partial effort but exerts full effort with the government loan.
This suggests that in order to maximise expected social welfare the government
should try to fund only those projects that will not be financed by the private market.
19We do not analyse the case where an entrepreneur is funded both by a VC firm and the govern-
ment. Generalizing the model in this way would raise informational complexities that would seriously
complicate the model – in particular, whether the VC would have the incentive and/or the ability to
credibly signal the project’s success probability to the government. It would also raise issues of how
the blended finance arrangement would affect the ability of the VC firm to implement its performance-
based contingent contract provisions without agreement of the government funder. A proper treatment
of this issue requires a separate analysis. We leave this for future research.
20Recall that VCs do not support entrepreneurs who are not induced to exert full effort.
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However, as we will show, this is only part of the story because avoiding redundancy
can restrict the set of projects being implemented, but some of these projects may
have large externalities that justify government support. In other words, it may be
impossible to generate additionality without also incurring some redundancy.
3 Analysis of Optimal Policy without Moral Hazard
In this section we solve for the optimal policy in the case in which both VCs and
the government can verify the entrepreneur’s investment of cP, and thus there is no
moral hazard. For simplicity we assume that k  cI , which implies weakly increasing
returns to effort. The purpose of this assumption is clarified in footnote 21 below.
Under this assumption, neither VCs nor the government would be interested
in supporting projects implemented with partial effort (which entrepreneurs can any-
way do on their own without outside support). VCs have no interest in supporting
partial effort because of our assumption that VCs require full effort to realize the ben-
efit of their advice (enhancing the success probability); and if the government can
generate positive expected social welfare with support of only partial entrepreneurial
effort, then it is also possible to do it with full effort, with even larger expected social
welfare.21
In this case, it can be shown that the function UP is given by22
UP(p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p 2
h
0, 1βR

minfβp, 1gR  1 if p 2
h
1
βR , 1
i
.
Entrepreneurs of type p 2 [0, 1βR ) abandon their projects, and entrepreneurs of type
p 2 [ 1βR , 1] develop their projects with VC funding of size 1  b, and pay the VC an
equity stake α(p). These entrepreneurs exert full effort.
The analysis of this case is intuitive and simple, and we believe it is interesting
in its own right. We start by describing the first-best solution in this case, i.e., the
21Equation (1) and the text below it imply that the maximal social welfare that is generated by
government support of a project with partial effort is pk(R + σ)   cI   λ(cI   b)(1   pk(1 + r)) =
pk(R+ σ)  cI(1+ λ) + pkλR. And, the maximal social welfare that is generated by government sup-
port of a project with full effort is p(R+ σ)  1  λ(1  b)(1  p(1+ r)) = p(R+ σ)  (1+ λ) + pλR.
With partial and full effort, non-negative social welfare requires that p  cI(1+λ)
(1+λ)kR+kσ and p  1+λ(1+λ)R+σ ,
respectively. Therefore, if k  cI , the social welfare associated with full effort is larger than that associ-
ated with partial effort for every p  1+λ
(1+λ)R+σ .
22When there is no moral hazard, the entrepreneur can either exert partial effort on its own and
obtain pkR  cI , exert full effort with VC support and obtain minfβp, 1gR  1, or drop the project. This
means that UP(p) = maxfpkR  cI , minfβp, 1gR  1, 0g. As mentioned above, we focus on the case
where the return to the entrepreneur from full effort is larger than from partial effort for every p  cIkR ,
which requires that β  1  kcI as assumed.
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optimal solution if the government could observe p. In many cases, the first-best is
only a theoretical benchmark that cannot be implemented in practice, but here the
first-best is (approximately) attainable if the entrepreneur faces no moral hazard.
3.1 First-Best
If the government can observe p, it should only support a project if it would not
otherwise be funded, that is
p <
1
βR
and if the project generates a positive expected social welfare with government sup-
port through some conditional loan contract (b, r):
p (R+ σ)  1  λ (1  b) (1  p (1+ r))  0. (4)
An entrepreneur will accept a government loan at interest rate r with self-financing
requirement b if it makes a nonnegative payoff
p (R  (1  b) (1+ r)) + (1  b)  1  0, (5)
and it cannot do better on its own, possibly with VC support. We assume that the
interest rate charged by the government on any conditional loan it makes is smaller
than or equal to R   1. Otherwise the entrepreneurs that the government targets –
those with p < 1βR – would make negative profits by accepting the loan.
23
To summarise, the constraint that a conditional loan contract (b, r) generates
positive expected welfare can be rewritten as:
p (R+ σ)  1  λ+ λ (b+ p (1  b) (1+ r)) > 0.
The necessary condition that the entrepreneur accepts a contract (b, r) – the participa-
tion constraint – can be rewritten as:
b+ p(1  b)(1+ r)  pR.
The fact that public funds are costly (λ  0) implies that maximising expected
welfare, subject to the entrepreneur’s participation constraint, implies that b+ p (1  b) (1+ r)
should be set as high as possible, and therefore equal to pR. Using this fact and
solving for p in (4), treating it as an equality, yields p = 1R+ σ1+λ
. Entrepreneurs with
p < 1R+ σ1+λ
should be excluded by the government because they generate negative
expected welfare. Entrepreneurs with p  1R+ σ1+λ should be supported unless p 
1
βR ,
in which case they would anyway be supported by VCs.24
23The entrepreneur’s expected payoff from a conditional loan B with interest rate r > R  1 is p(R 
B(1+ r)) + B  1  p(R  BR) + B  1 = (1  B)(pR  1). This is negative for p < 1βR .
24Of course, if 1βR <
1
R+ σ1+λ
then the government should not support any entrepreneur. This occurs
when the externality σ  (β   1)(1 + λ)R is too small to justify government support. We proceed
under the assumption that this is not the case here.
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There are many (b, r) contracts that satisfy the equation b+ p (1  b) (1+ r) =
pR for any given probability p. Of particular note is the contract (b, r) = (0, R  1)
because it is independent of the value of p, and it satisfies this equation for every
value 1R+ σ1+λ
< p < 1βR . This suggests that the government may be able to set b and r
optimally even without being able to observe p. We show this in the next section.
3.2 Optimal Policy without Moral Hazard
Suppose that the government cannot observe p. The problem with the contract (b, r) =
(0, R   1) is that it induces an expected payoff of zero to the entrepreneur, regard-
less of its type. Therefore, such a contract may be picked by entrepreneurs with
p < 1R+ σ1+λ
, which would reduce welfare.
We now describe a family of contracts fbε, rεgε>0 , parametrized by ε, such that
each contract induces an increasing payoff to the entrepreneur that is linear in p and
equal to 0 at the point p = 1R+ σ1+λ
. This means that entrepreneurs with p < 1R+ σ1+λ
will refuse contracts in this family. Furthermore, the slope of the induced payoff is
decreasing in ε so that the entrepreneur’s payoff from this contract decreases to zero
as ε tends to zero. This implies that, as ε tends to zero, the contract (bε, rε) described
below approximates the first-best outcome.
Define
rε = R  1  ε; bε = ε (1+ λ)
σ+ ε (1+ λ)
.
It is easy to verify that the expected payoff to an entrepreneur of type p from accepting
the contract (bε, rε) is
ε ((1+ λ) R+ σ)
ε (1+ λ) + σ
p  ε (1+ λ)
σ+ ε (1+ λ)
.
This payoff function is linear in p, is equal to zero at p = 1R+ σ1+λ
, and its slope decreases
to zero with ε as required.
An entrepreneur p prefers the contract (bε, rε) to developing the project with VC
support or dropping the project if and only if
p (R  (1  bε)(1+ rε)) + (1  bε)  1  max fβpR  1, 0g ,
which is equivalent to
1
R+ σ1+λ
 p < 1
1+ rε +
(β 1)R
1 bε
.
The fact that the denominator 1+ rε +
(β 1)R
1 bε increases to βR as ε decreases to
zero implies that, by choosing a mechanism (bε, rε) with a small ε > 0, the govern-
ment can minimise the set of ‘redundant’ projects p 2

1
βR ,
1
1+rε+
(β 1)R
1 bε

that would
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have been developed anyway with VC support. Moreover, because rε approaches
R  1 as ε approaches 0, the government can extract almost the entire rent from each
participating entrepreneur. It follows that a mechanism (bε, rε) with a small ε > 0
allows the government to approximate the first-best solution.
However, note that the specific contract (bε, rε) will depend on the values of λ
and σ which define the lower bound of p at which the entrepreneur would accept the
contract, as given above. We call such a (bε, rε) contract the “zero liability contract” be-
cause, as ε decreases to zero, the potential liability (loss) incurred by an entrepreneur
who takes it decreases to zero as well.
Proposition 2. (Optimal Policy w/o Moral Hazard) It is possible to approximate the first-
best solution with a conditional loan contract (bε, rε) that tends to the zero liability contract
(b, r) = (0, R  1) as ε tends to zero.25
The economic intuition for this result is that the optimal policy charges a high
interest rate to induce entrepreneurs with p  1βR to prefer developing their projects
on their own: the higher the interest rate (smaller ε) the smaller the set of subsidized
projects that would have been financed by the market. But increasing the interest rate
also reduces the set of socially desirable projects that would accept the government’s
contract. To induce such entrepreneurs to seek a government loan, the government
increases the size of the loan so as to make it just profitable for them to implement
their projects. Notice also that, somewhat paradoxically, the optimal policy calls for
(almost) fully funding the supported projects (b is approximately equal to zero) even
though public funds are more expensive than private funds.
The mechanism described here has one unattractive property: it leaves almost
no rent for the entrepreneur and thus gives no incentive to exert greater effort. This
is not a problem if the entrepreneur’s effort is verifiable or if the project’s probability
of success is exogenous. However, if the entrepreneur’s unverifiable effort affects
the probability of success, we need the optimal mechanism to incorporate this moral
hazard. We address this issue in the next section.
25It is possible to implement the first-best solution exactly with the following direct revelation mech-
anism: ask entrepreneurs to report their type p. If an entrepreneur reports a type p 2
h
1
R+ σ1+λ
, 1βR
i
,
then offer a loan with interest rate r = R  1 and self-financing requirement b = 0. If the reported type
p lies outside this interval, do not offer any loan. It is straightforward to verify that this mechanism
is incentive compatible and ex-post efficient, and thus implements the first-best outcome. However,
this mechanism may be difficult to implement because, apart from requiring entrepreneurs to report
their type which may be difficult to do in practice, entrepreneurs with types p 2
h
0, 1βR
i
are indifferent
between reporting their types truthfully or not, but it is crucial for the efficiency of the mechanism that
they report their types truthfully. We are grateful to Phil Reny for this observation.
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4 Analysis of Optimal Policy with Moral Hazard
4.1 Optimal Policy
We now analyze the case with moral hazard, where the entrepreneur can exert addi-
tional effort to increase the probability of success. The timing of moves is as follows:
an entrepreneur learns its probability of success p and decides whether to make an
initial investment of cI . Next the entrepreneur decides whether to seek funding either
from a VC or to obtain a government loan that would help it complete its project and,
if it receives additional funding, whether to exert full effort. The payoff to the entre-
preneur is whatever remains after the VC takes its share or the entrepreneur repays
its government loan. The loan is not repaid if the project fails.
As explained above, we assume the government offers entrepreneurs to choose
whatever their preferred combination (bσ, rσ) of self financing requirement and inter-
est rate from a menu of such choices f(bσ, rσ)g. We denote the government contract
that maximises entrepreneur p’s payoff by (bσ(p), rσ(p)). Again, for notational sim-
plicity, we henceforth omit the subscript σ.
Let UG(p) denote the payoff to entrepreneur p if she chooses the government
contract (b(p), r(p)). Observe that
UG(p)  maxfp(R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)))  b(p), kp(R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)))+ 1  b(p)  cIg
where the first and second terms in the braces describe the expected payoff to en-
trepreneur p under government contract (b(p), r(p)) when she exerts full and partial
effort, respectively. Note that UG(p)may be smaller than the expected payoff to entre-
preneur p in the private market, UP(p), in which case type p prefers either to obtain
VC funding, to develop its project on its own, or to drop the project.
Moral Hazard Constraint: A government contract (b, r) induces full effort from an en-
trepreneur of type p who receives government support if
p(R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b  kp(R  (1  b)(1+ r)) + 1  b  cI . (6)
This inequality is satisfied if and only if
p  1  cI
1  k 
1
R  (1  b)(1+ r) . (7)
Participation Constraint: A government contract (b, r) induces an entrepreneur of type
p to accept a government loan if the expected payoff to the entrepreneur under the
government contract with either full or partial effort is larger than or equal to what
the entrepreneur can obtain in the private market:
UG (p)  UP(p).
17
Incentive Compatibility Constraint: A menu of government contracts f(b(p), r(p))gpp
is incentive compatible for types p  p if each type p  p is induced to choose the
government contract (b(p), r(p)) , when its choice is restricted to only government
contracts, and to exert full effort.
Since the government contract (b(p), r(p)) denotes the preferred choice of entre-
preneur p from the menu of contracts, incentive compatibility merely implies that the
menu offered by the government induces full effort for all types p  p who choose
a government contract. It does not imply that types p < p who choose a govern-
ment contract would exert full effort, and it does not imply that types p  p would
necessarily choose a government contract. Indeed, they may well prefer VC support.
The following characterisation of incentive compatible menus follows from stan-
dard arguments in mechanism design.
Proposition 3. A menu f(b(p), r(p))gpp is incentive compatible for types p  p if and
only if the induced expected payoff function of the entrepreneur p (R  (1  b(p)) (1+ r(p))) 
b(p) is monotone increasing and convex for types p  p, and type p is induced to exert full
effort.
The government’s objective is to choose an incentive compatible menu fb(p), r(p)gpp
that maximises expected welfare, taking into account two considerations: (1) projects
with p  cIkR will be financed by the entrepreneurs themselves (possibly with VC sup-
port), if they do not obtain a government loan; and (2) among entrepreneurs who
choose any government contract, some (those with p  p) may exert full effort while
others (with p < p) may exert only partial effort.
Proposition 4. (Optimal Policy with Moral Hazard) The optimal menu of government con-
tracts consists of at most two contracts: one that induces full effort from some entrepreneurs
who would exert partial or no effort otherwise, and another that induces partial effort from
some entrepreneurs who would not have implemented the project otherwise.
The intuition for this result is as follows: As explained in Section 3.1, because
public funds are costly, the maximisation of social welfare requires that entrepreneurs’
payoffs be minimised. Proposition 3 shows that the incentive compatibility of govern-
ment contracts implies that their induced payoffs to entrepreneurs are increasing and
convex. The smallest possible increasing and convex function p (R  (1  b(p)) (1+ r(p))) 
b(p) is linear, which is the payoff that is induced by a single government contract. The
fact that, if a certain type p is induced to exert full effort by some government con-
tract then so do all higher types p0 > p, implies that there is no need for more than
one government contract that induces full effort. A similar argument shows that there
is no need for more than one government contract that induces partial effort.26
26As mentioned in the introduction, this intuition is analogous to the one that underlies the famous
“no-haggling” result in monopoly pricing (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983).
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Proposition 5. The optimal government contract that induces partial effort is the “zero liabil-
ity contract”, (bε, rε) 

0, RcI   1

, which attracts low probability projects that are welfare-
increasing but not privately profitable. The optimal government contract that induces full
effort is a “maximum outlay contract” (b, r) for some interest rate r.
The zero liability contract offers a loan of cI (more precisely, cI  bε) and induces
projects that would not otherwise be implemented to be partially implemented. This
contract thus generates additionality at the extensive margin. The self-financing require-
ment under this contract is approximately equal to zero. In contrast, the maximum
outlay contract that induces full effort from some entrepreneurs who would not exert
full effort otherwise is a (b, r) contract, in which the self-financing requirement b is set
equal to the upper bound b. This contract generates additionality both at the extensive
and intensive margins.
The intuition for the optimality of the zero liability contract is identical to the one
offered in the case without moral hazard. Namely, the zero liability contract induces
the entrepreneur to exert partial effort while yielding no socially costly rent. The in-
tuition for the optimality of the maximum outlay contract stems from the fact that the
expected payoff to the entrepreneur under a government contract (b, r) is decreasing
in b+ p(1  b)(1+ r) if the entrepreneur exerts full effort (or b+ pk(1  b)(1+ r)with
partial effort). Optimality requires that the socially costly rent to the entrepreneur be
minimized, and thus that b+ p(1  b)(1+ r) (or b+ pk(1  b)(1+ r)) be maximized.
The moral hazard constraint implies an upper bound on the value of (1  b)(1+ r).
It therefore follows that optimality implies that b should be set at its upper bound,
b = b, while the interest rate r is adjusted so that (1  b)(1+ r) is set equal to the
upper bound induced by the moral hazard constraint.
Figure 1 depicts the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from VC funding, and from
a menu that includes two contracts: the zero liability contract, and some (not neces-
sarily optimal) maximum outlay contract. As the figure shows, the maximum outlay
contract, which is introduced in order to induce full effort, is also chosen by some
entrepreneur’s types who only exert partial effort, and would have also exerted par-
tial effort if this contract was not offered. This redundancy means that a maximum
outlay contract may be very costly for the government. It would be offered only if k
is relatively small (moral hazard is less severe), as the extra effort has a high payoff,
and if the set of such projects is small, which depends on the density of F(p).
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Whether the government prefers to offer only one of the contracts or both de-
pends on which policy generates higher welfare, which in turn depends on the para-
meters of the model: the values of k, private returns R, externality σ, and shadow price
of public funds λ (as well as b¯ and the distribution F(p)). However, we can show a
stronger result. Under a relatively weak assumption, it is optimal for the government
to offer only one contract.
Proposition 6. If b+ cI  1, then the optimal menu includes only one contract, either a zero
liability contract, or a maximum outlay contract.
Given the calibrated parameters we use (Appendix A), the inequality b+ cI  1
is easily satisfied. We discuss the conditions under which each contract is offered in
the next sub-section and in the simulations.
4.2 Analysis of Sorting and its Implications
The government loan and private market contracts generate endogenous sorting of
entrepreneurs, as we discussed in the previous Section and depicted in Figure 1. This
sorting has implications for the project additionality and welfare, which we discuss
in this Section.
The first two graphs in Figure 2 display the sorting of projects induced by the
private market and the zero liability contract (the labelling of the regions depicted
in Figure 2 correspond to the labels in Figure 1). Note that the zero liability contract
induces some projects that were not implemented by the private market to be partially
implemented, and thus generates project additionality at the extensive margin. These
new projects are those with low success probabilities, p 2

1
R+ σ1+λ
, cIkR

, represented
in Region B. This project additionality increases with the externality σ, and declines
with the shadow price of public funds λ. This zero liability contract does not fund
projects that would have been implemented by the private market, i.e., it does not
generate any redundancy.
The welfare gain generated by the zero liability contract (relative to the private
market) can be written as
Z
σ
Z cI
kR
1
R+ σ1+λ
[kp(R+ σ)  (1+ λ)(cI   kpR] dFσ(p) > 0
As this welfare gain is positive, the zero liability contract always improves upon the
private market, whether or not it is optimal. The welfare gain increases with σ, but
the effect of λ is ambiguous.27
27With respect to σ, this is correct provided an increase in σ does not reduce the density of p in the
relevant interval too much. The welfare gain declines with λ if cI  k, and thus holds under constant
returns to effort k = cI .
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The third graph displays the sorting generated when both the zero liability and
(arbitrary) maximum outlay contract, (b¯, r), is offered (note that the specific thresholds
L2 and L3 depend on the interest rate in the (b¯, r) contract, and thus are not shown).
Unlike the zero liability contract, the maximum outlay contract shifts some projects
from partial to full effort. Thus it generates project additionality at the intensive mar-
gin (Region E).28 However, it also creates redundancy, as projects previously funded
by the entrepreneur’s own funds with partial effort now shift to the government (b¯, r)
contract and only exert partial effort (Region F). This makes it costly, as compared to
the zero liability contract.
As shown, the zero liability contract always improves welfare relative to the
private market. However, this is not generally true for an arbitrary maximum outlay
contract because it may generate redundancy. This is more costly when λ is high.
On the other hand, the maximum outlay contract has the advantage that it induces
intensive (and possibly extensive) additionality, and this welfare gain increases in σ.
These observations suggest that this contract is likely to be optimal only when λ is
low and σ is high enough. The simulations in Section 6 confirm this conclusion.
Also note that the zero liability contract does not maximize the set of projects be-
ing implemented. This implies that in those cases where the zero liability contract is
optimal, project additionality is not being maximised. This finding means that project
additionality and redundancy are not necessarily appropriate criteria to evaluate the
effectiveness of R&D support schemes, which is the approach taken in the policy lit-
erature.
4.3 Extensions
4.3.1 Uncertainty about private returns
In this section we show that our main result – that the optimal contract includes at
most one contract that induces full effort and another contract that induces partial
effort (Proposition 4) – is robust to adding asymmetric information about the success
payoff, R. To analyse this, suppose that R has two possible values, RH > RL > 1.
Entrepreneurs and VCs know the realisation of R but the government does not.
Suppose that the government offers two alternative contracts, (b, r) and (b0, r0),
and that the entrepreneur does not have an outside option. It is easy to show that if
type (p, RL) prefers the contract (b, r) to (b0, r0), then so does type (p, RH), and vice
versa.29 This fact implies that the government cannot screen entrepreneurs based
28In Figure 2, which corresponds to the payoffs depicted in Figure 1, the maximum outlay contract
does not increase the number of implemented projects, and thus does not generate extensive addition-
ality. But this can happen in the general case, as it depends on where the red lines in Figure 1 (payoffs
with the maximum outlay contracts with partial and full effort) intersect the y-axis.
29Type (p, RL) prefers government contract (b, r) to contract (b0, r0) if and only if p(RL   (1  b)(1+
r))  b  p(RL  (1  b0)(1+ r0)) ..This This holds if and only if p(RH   (1  b)(1+ r))  b  p(RH  
(1   b0)(1 + r0))   b0 which holds if and only if type (p, RH) prefers government contract (b, r) to
contract (b0, r0).
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on R, and therefore the optimal government policy involves only two contracts, as
before, one to induce full effort and another to induce partial effort. The next proposi-
tion shows that this result also holds if we allow the entrepreneur to have an outside
option to drop the project or obtain private VC funding.
Proposition 7. Suppose that R has two values, RH > RL > 1. The optimal menu of
government contracts consists of at most two contracts: one that induces full effort from some
entrepreneurs who would not exert full effort otherwise, and another that induces partial effort
from some entrepreneurs who would not exert partial effort otherwise.
For simplicity, this argument was made for the case in which R can have two
possible realisations, but it also applies to any number of possible realisations larger
than two.
4.3.2 Government budget constraint
We have assumed that the government does not face a budget constraint. Introduc-
ing a constraint does not fundamentally alter the analysis, if there is a continuum of
projects (in terms of p and σ). In order to maximise expected welfare, the government
should simply rank projects by the welfare per dollar of government money invested
and then fund them in descending order until the budget is exhausted. Of course, to
do this the government must first compute the optimal policy for each σ, as discussed
before.
However, if there is a discrete number of indivisible projects, this criterion may
create a ‘knapsack problem’. Specifically, it may be the case that the project which
generates the highest expected welfare per dollar invested requires a large investment
that prevents the government from investing in other projects, whereas the project
with the second highest expected welfare per dollar invested is cheaper and allows
for more welfare enhancing investments. However, this is a computational, rather
than a conceptual, problem that can be addressed with existing algorithms.
5 Optimal VC Subsidy
Our paper focuses on the optimal design of government R&D loans. However, in
the simulation analysis that follows, we want to compare the welfare performance of
the optimal loan policy against an alternative policy of direct subsidies to the private
VC market. In this section we describe this policy and characterise the optimal VC
subsidy to be used in the simulations.
We assume that the government provides a subsidy at rate δ on every dollar
invested by private VC’s. Then VC profits are
ΠVC = Min fβp, 1g αR  (1  b¯)(1  δ)
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Since VC’s are assumed to make zero expected profit, the subsidy reduces the equity
stake they require. For a project of type p, the equity stake is
α(p) =
 
1  b¯ (1  δ)
Min fβp, 1g R .
The welfare generated by a project of type p, which we denote by W(p; δ), is
the sum of the payoff to the entrepreneur and the expected spillover pσ if the entre-
preneur exerts full effort (or kpσ with partial effort), minus the cost of the subsidy
δ(1  b¯)(1+ λ) :
W(p, δ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if p 2 0, cIkR
kp (R+ σ)  cI if p 2

cI
kR ,
1 cI
(β k)R +
(1 b)(1 δ)
βR

βp (R+ σ)  1  λδ(1  b¯) if p 2

1 cI
(β k)R +
(1 b)(1 δ)
βR ,
1
β

(R+ σ)  1  λδ(1  b¯) if p 2 [ 1β , 1]
(8)
where we omit other parameters of the welfare function, including the cost of pub-
lic funds. Entrepreneurs in the first interval of p drop their projects, while those in
the second interval implement their projects with partial effort which they can fund
themselves. Projects supported by VC’s are those in the last two intervals.
The optimal subsidy rate is found by maximizing W(δ) =
R 1
0 W(p; δ)dFσ(p)
with respect to δ, given a value of the externality σ. Note that we do not assume that
the externality σ and the probability p are independent in this analysis. After some
manipulation, we can write the first order condition as
(β  k) L(δ) (R+ σ)  λδ(1  b¯)  λ (1  Fσ(L))
dFσ(L)
βR  (1  cI) = 0
where L(δ) = 1 cI
(1 k)βR +
(1 b)(1 δ)
βR .
30 In general there is no closed form solution for
the optimal subsidy δ.31 However, under the assumption that the hazard rate of
30The first term is the incremental benefit of the VC subsidy: without VC support the success prob-
ability is kp;with VC support it is max(βp, 1). Thus (β  k)(R+ σ) is the social gain over the relevant
mass of projects given by p  L. The second term is the cost of the subsidy at the margin, and the third
is the inframarginal cost since the subsidy applies to all VC-supported projects.
31In the simulation analysis we assume that σ and p are independent. We specify and calibrate a
Beta distribution for F(p) and compute the corresponding optimal subsidy. The optimal subsidy rate
depends on both the project externality σ and shadow price of public funds λ. If the government cannot
condition the VC subsidy on the project externality, then the optimal subsidy rate should be computed
using the mean value of σ.We assume this to be the case in the simulations. Conditioning the subsidy
on σ would require that the government inspect every project with VC support, and this would be
administratively difficult.
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the distribution Fσ(p) is non-decreasing (in the neighborhood of L), we derive the
following comparative statics results:
∂δ
∂σ
> 0,
∂δ
∂λ
< 0,
∂δ
∂β
R 0
As expected, the optimal VC subsidy rate increases with the project externality
and declines with the cost of public funds. The effectiveness of VC firms at enhancing
a project’s probability of success, β, has an ambiguous effect on the optimal subsidy.
The reason is that an increase in β implies a higher probability of success and thus
larger expected externality from any funded projects. However, at the same time,
the higher β induces more projects with lower p to go to the VCs and this increases
the subsidy cost on infra-marginal projects since the government cannot condition the
subsidy on p.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to show analytically whether welfare is higher
with the optimal VC subsidy or the R&D loan contract. In part this is because which
R&D contract is optimal – the zero liability or maximum outlay contract – depends
on underlying parameters including σ and λ. The simulations in the next section il-
lustrate the comparative static results quantitatively and compares the welfare from
the optimal R&D loan policy and the optimal VC subsidy.
6 Simulations
In this section we simulate the model with moral hazard and compute the welfare
generated by the optimal policy and typical loan/grant schemes we observe in prac-
tice. We also illustrate how their performance varies with parameters of the model.
We calibrate the parameters of the model based on a variety of data sources (online
Appendix A for details). 32
6.1 Optimal loan policy vs. private VC market
We begin by comparing performance metrics of the optimal policy relative to the pri-
vate market. Table 1 presents results for the baseline case of β = 1.12 (i.e., VC support
increases the success probability by 12%) for different values of the shadow price of
public funds, λ, and different levels of externality as measured by the ratio of social
32The required parameters includes the private returns to a project R, distribution of success prob-
abilities F(p), project externality σ, shadow price of public funds λ, project costs with partial effort
cI , entrepreneur’s funds as a share of project cost with full effort b¯, and the effectiveness of VC’s in
enhancing a project’s success probability β.
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to private returns to R&D.33 We indicate whether the optimal policy is the zero lia-
bility contract, or the maximum outlay contract (in the latter, we include the optimal
interest rate, r).
Table 1 highlights several important features. First, in nearly all cases the optimal
policy is the zero liability contract. This conclusion holds across a wide range of values
for the cost of public funds and size of the externality. The reason is that the zero lia-
bility contract produces no redundancy, while the maximum outlay, or (b, r), contract
involves redundancy which is socially costly unless λ is very low.
Second, the maximum outlay contract is optimal only when λ is low and the
externality is large, as shown in Panels D and E. It is interesting to note that, in those
cases, the optimal policy takes the form of a full grant (r =  1).34 Though this contract
entails redundancy and a large government outlay, this is not too costly at low λ. With
this contract, all projects are implemented and some projects that were implemented
with partial effort switch to full effort, both of which are more valuable when σ is
high. But while large externalities can make it worth incurring this social cost at
moderate levels of λ, at high levels of λ the zero liability contract is again optimal.
It is also noteworthy that, even in the three cases where the zero liability contract is
not optimal, the welfare gains from using it, relative to the private market, are still
substantial (27% and 35%, not shown).
33Online Appendix Tables B1 and B2 present the tables for the case β = 1.0, where VCs do not
enhance project success, and β = 1.24 where VCs are more effective. The qualitative results in these
cases are similar to the baseline specification, but the welfare gains from the optimal (zero liability)
contract are smaller when the private VC market is more effective at enhancing project success.
34For the reported parameter values, when the maximum outlay contract is optimal, the associated
interest rate is actually more than a full grant (i.e. r <  1). In these cases we set it at r =  1.
The reason it can be more than a full grant is that for low enough cost of public funds and large
enough externality, it can be welfare improving for the government to pay entrepreneurs to undertake
projects in order to secure the externalities. From a theoretical perspective, this implies that the set of
projects entreprenreurs bring to the table depends on how large the payment r <  1 – i.e., it makes
the distribution F(p) endogenous, which is beyond the scope of our model. Also, from a political
perrspective, such a policy is likely to be difficult to implement.
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Third, the optimal zero liability generates substantial welfare gains, unless the
externality is very small (as in Panel A). Not surprisingly, the gains strongly increase
with the size of the externality and decline with the cost of public funds. The welfare
gains range from a low of about 4.4% to a high of 30.7%.
In this paper we model the financing of R&D projects in a partial equilibrium
setting. Thus the welfare gains reported above correspond to the ‘R&D sector’, not
the aggregate economy. By way of comparison, Acemoglu et al. (2018) use an esti-
mated macroeconomic growth model to assess welfare gains from various innovation-
related fiscal policies. In particular, they show that an R&D subsidy for incumbent
firms, equivalent to 14% of their R&D (1% of GDP), increases welfare in their model
by 0.6%. For the optimal (uniform) subsidy in their model, which is equivalent to
39% of R&D, the increase is 1.22%. In order to compare their aggregate welfare gains
to those in Table 1, we need to account for the fact that ours relate only to the R&D
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sector, and to account for the differences in the scale (government cost) of our optimal
loan policy and the subsidies considered by the Acemoglu et al. study. Making these
adjustments, the welfare gains from the optimal zero liability contract in Panel C are
equivalent to roughly 0.62% to 0.87% (depending on λ), as compared to their estimate
of 0.6% for the 14% subsidy. When compared to their 1.22 welfare gains from their
39% optimal subsidy, our estimated welfare gains are 1.73% to 2.42%.35
Although their framework and policy instruments are different from those in
our paper, the welfare gains are broadly similar. That our welfare gains are somewhat
higher may not be surprising since the optimal mechanism is designed to mitigate the
adverse selection effects that arise in their model. At the same time, we do not want
to overinterpret the simulation results; they should be viewed as illustrative, given
the simplicity of the model and the specific calibration of parameters.
6.2 Optimal loan policy vs. other schemes
Finally, we compare the optimal policy to loan schemes typically used by govern-
ments and to a direct subsidy to private VC firms. Loan schemes almost always in-
volve a single interest rate and matching requirement, whereas in our optimal policy
these features vary with the project externality σ and the shadow price of public funds
λ. Typically, observed policies are either full grant schemes or interest-free loans.
Table 2 presents the welfare gains per dollar of cost for different policies, rela-
tive to the private market. When externalities are small (Panel A), the zero liability
contract generates about 21 cents net welfare gain per dollar (i.e., a benefit-cost ratio
of 1.21), but this increases sharply with the size of the externality and declines with
the cost of public funds. When social returns are twice as large as private returns, the
benefit-cost ratio varies from 2.6, for λ = 2, to 3.7 for λ = 1.25. By contrast, a full
grant or zero-interest loan contract actually reduces welfare, unless externalities are
very large, implying benefit-cost ratios less than one.
35To do this, decompose the change in aggregate welfare into the part generated by the R&D sector
and by other sectors, denoted by ∆WA = ∆WR&D + ∆WO. But ∆WO = 0 since we account for all the
externalities generated by the R&D sector. Thus ∆WAWA =
∆WR&D
WR&D
WR&D
WA
. We assume that WR&DWA is roughly
equal to the ratio of R&D sector output to GDP, which can be expressed as (1+ρs) R&DGDP where R&D is
the input (expenditure) and ρs is the social rate of return to R&D. Setting ρs = 0.55 from Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013), this adjustment factor is 4.25% (= 1.55 2.74%, which is the
ratio of R&D/GDP in the U.S. in 2016).
In addition, we adjust for the relative cost of the optimal loan and subsidy policies. Acemoglu et
al. report that their R&D subsidy is 14% of R&D, while their optimal subsidy is 39% of R&D. The
simulated cost of our optimal zero liability R&D loan policy in Panel C in Table 1 is about 12% of
R&D in our model (averaged across values of λ). Thus we scale our welfare gains up by the factor
1.17 = 0.14/0.12 to compare to their 14% subsidy, and by 3.25 = 0.39/0.12 for comparison to their
optimal subsidy.
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The optimal VC subsidy generates welfare gains for almost all levels of the ex-
ternality and cost of public funds, but the associated benefit-cost ratio is smaller than
for the optimal loan policy.36 For example, when social returns are twice as large as
private returns (Panel C), the benefit-cost ratio for the optimal zero liability contract
36For the parameter configurations presented here, the optimal VC subsidy rate δ > 1 (it varies from
1.25 to 1.83). This is because the VC’s enhance the project success probability significantly (calibrated
at 12%), so it can be welfare-improving for the government to raise revenue and actually pay VC firms
in order to enhance project success. In these cases, we set δ = 1. Paying VC firms (δ > 1) would raise
adverse selection effects for VC participants, which are beyond the scope of our analysis, and likely to
be politically difficult to implement. This issue is analogous to implementing more than a full grant in
the maximum outlay contract (see footnote 30).
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is between 2.6 and 3.7, while it is only 1.35 to 2.16 for the (constrained) optimal VC
subsidy. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that the VC subsidy does much
better than either a full grant or zero interest loan, both of which are widely adopted
by governments.
Of course, we recognise that any simulation analysis is limited by the simplicity
of the model and the realism of the calibrated parameters. Still, our results at least
suggest that loan policies often used by governments – full grants or zero interest
loans – may be inferior to the zero liability loan policy or a direct subsidy to VCs. This
is especially the case where the social cost of public funds is high and/or externalities
are small. While many factors play a role, countries with weaker institutional capacity
are likely to have less efficient tax systems, and thus a higher cost of public funds.
Unless the externalities are especially high in such countries, the results suggest that
typical R&D loan schemes are likely to be ill-suited for developing countries.
Why do R&D loan programs in the real world differ sharply from the theoreti-
cally optimal policy? A policy of ‘targeting the middle’ is likely to be politically less
attractive to governments than targeting the ‘best’ (low risk) projects, as is often done
in practice. Being able to show program ‘successes’ may increase prospects for bud-
getary support. The social cost of redundancy which such a program entails remains
hidden. In addition, the public agency responsible for the program may worry about
the government’s commitment to fund it in the future, and hedge this risk by choos-
ing profitable projects if they can retain the proceeds. Whatever the reason, our paper
indicates that moving to the optimal loan policy (or direct VC subsidy) can potentially
generate significant welfare gains.
7 Concluding remarks
We study the optimal design of government loan financing of R&D projects that vary
in risk and generate positive externalities. Such programs are often used to support
innovation by start-up companies. We show that, when there is adverse selection
over project risk, the optimal contract requires a high interest rate but (virtually) zero
self-financing. This contrasts sharply with observed policies that use zero or nega-
tive interest rates and high self-financing provisions. When we add moral hazard, by
allowing the entrepreneur to choose between two effort levels, the optimal policy con-
sists of a menu of at most two contracts – one with high interest/zero self-financing
and a second with lower interest but maximum feasible co-financing. Moreover, un-
der a mild assumption, we show that only one contract is optimal.
The simulations of the model indicate that the optimal zero liability policy can
generate significant welfare gains, relative to the private market and government poli-
cies we typically observe, especially when project externalities are large and the cost
of public funds is low. We also find that an optimal direct subsidy to private VC’s
outperforms either a full grant or zero interest loan policy, both of which are widely
used by governments.
There are two core policy implications. First, optimal policies should ‘target the
middle’. Low-risk projects are likely to be financed by the private market anyway, so
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government support is redundant. High-risk projects will not be privately funded
but, unless they generate very large externalities, the expected social payoff does not
justify supporting them.
Second, R&D support policies need to be tailored to the economic environment – one
size does not fit all. The size of project externalities, cost of public funds and effective-
ness of the private venture capital market are key parameters that affect the optimal
policy. If externalities differ across technology fields, the parameters of the policy
should ideally vary by field. The same principle applies across countries, where both
project externalities and the cost of public funds may vary as well.
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Appendix. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows from the arguments above the statement of Proposi-
tion 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows from the arguments above the statement of Proposi-
tion 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. An incentive compatible menu satisfies
UG(p)  p (R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)))  b(p)  p
 
R  (1  b(p0))(1+ r(p0))  b(p0)
and
UG(p0)  p0
 
R  (1  b(p0))(1+ r(p0))  b(p0)  p0 (R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)))  b(p)
for any two types p > p0 > p. It follows that
(p  p0)  R  (1  b(p0))(1+ r(p0))  UG(p) UG(p0)  (p  p0) (R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)))
from which it follows that (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)) is non-increasing in p  p. Dividing
the last inequality by p  p0 and taking the limit as p0 & p implies that the derivative
of UG(p) is equal to (R  (1  b(p))(1+ r(p))) whenever it is continuous in p, which
because of monotonicity holds a.s. in p  p. And, the fact that the derivative of
UG(p) is non-increasing implies that UG(p) is convex for p  p.
Conversely, if UG(p) is convex and type p is induced to exert full effort, then
the payoff that any type p0  p obtains from selecting the contract (b(p), r(p)) is
obtained on a line at the point (p, UG(p))with slope U0G(p), at the point p
0 on that line.
Convexity of UG(p) implies that this payoff lies below UG(p0)which is the payoff that
type p0 obtains by being truthful.
Finally, rearrangement of the moral hazard constraint (6) shows that a govern-
ment contract (b, r) induces full effort from type p if and only if
p  1  cI
1  k 
1
R  (1  b) (1+ r) .
It follows that if p is induced to exert full effort under (b, r), then so is every p  p
because convexity of UG(p) implies that (1  b(p)) (1+ r(p)) is nonincreasing in p 
p. 
Proof of Proposition 4. A government contract (b, r) induces an expected payoff to
entrepreneurs of p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b that is linear in p. Increasing b pivots this
payoff function in the sense that it increases its slope R  (1  b)(1+ r) and lowers its
intercept b. Increasing b and r in such a way that keeps (1  b)(1+ r) fixed shifts the
payoff function downwards in a parallel way. Following the last part of the proof of
Proposition 3, the moral hazard constraint (6) implies that if p is induced to exert full
effort under (b, r), then so is every p0 > p, and that both increasing b and increasing
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b and r in a way that keeps (1  b)(1+ r) fixed preserves p’s incentive to exert full
effort.
Suppose that the optimal menu induces some entrepreneur p  1 cIR(β k) + 1 bβR
who would not exert full effort under the private market to exert full effort. Denote
the smallest type that is induced to exert full effort by the optimal menu by p and
the government contract that is chosen by p by (b, r). The fact that p is induced to
choose the contract (b, r) implies that p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b  UP(p).
Recall that
UP(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if p 2 0, cIkR project is dropped
kpR  cI if p 2
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

project implemented with partial effort
minfβp, 1gR  1 if p 2
h
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR , 1
i
project implemented with full effort
Distinguish the following three cases:
1. The function p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b has a slope smaller than or equal to kR
(i.e., flatter than UP(p) in the interval
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

, and it intersects UP(p)
above or to the right of the point 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR (recall that UP(p) is discontinuous
at p = 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR ) or lies entirely above UP(p).
2. The function p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b has a slope smaller than or equal to kR
and it intersects UP(p) at a point in the interval
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

.
3. The function p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b has a slope larger than kR.
Case 1. b and r can be increased in such a way that keeps (1  b)(1+ r) fixed so that
the function p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b shifts down in a parallel way and the intersec-
tion point with UP(p) moves left. This change satisfies the moral hazard constraint
for p  p and increases social welfare because from (1) it follows that an increase in
social welfare requires that b + p(1  b)(1+ r) be increased. The suggested change
accomplishes this goal without violating the moral hazard constraint. It follows that
if the function p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b intersects the function UP(p) above or to the
right of the point 1 cIR(β k) +
1 b
βR then either b is increased up to the point where it is
equal to b, or the entrepreneur’s payoff function is shifted down so that it intersects
UP(p) on the interval
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

, which is analysed in Case 2 below.
Case 2. Such an intersection necessarily implies that p (R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b is flat-
ter than UP(p) between
cI
kR and
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR . In this case, it is possible to increase
b and decrease r so that (1  b)(1+ r) decreases and b+ p(1  b)(1+ r) increases,
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where p  p denotes the smallest type that selects the modified contract. The de-
crease in (1  b)(1+ r) ensures that the moral hazard constraint is satisfied for p  p,
and the increase in b + p(1  b)(1+ r) ensures that social welfare is increased for
p  p. Notice that the fact that the new contract generates a larger social welfare
implies that it is less attractive to the entrepreneurs, so that some types who accepted
the government contract (b, r) may reject the modified contract. However, as shown
below, it is possible to induce types who anyway exert partial effort to exert partial
effort costlessly using a zero liability contract if this contributes to social welfare, so
that the modified contract does not decrease overall efficiency. Thus, it again follows
that social welfare is increasing in b, so b = b¯ in this case as well.
Case 3. All the types p > p exert full effort either under the contract (b, r) or under
the private market. So, again there is no need for an additional contract because such
a contract cannot increase overall effort, and would generate a larger payoff to the
entrepreneurs who select it, at the expense of social welfare.
Finally, observe that a contract that induces full effort from some type p 
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR may also be accepted by types p < p
 who would not be induced by
it to exert full effort. Nevertheless, the government may still benefit from offering
entrepreneurs another contract, which induces only partial effort because such a con-
tract may increase participation from entrepreneurs who otherwise would drop their
projects. As explained in the analysis of the problem without moral hazard, this addi-
tional contract would require an arbitrarily small self-financing, ε, and a payment of
R  ε upon success, which implies an interest rate of approximately 1+ r = RcI . Such a
contract would extract approximately the entire rent of entrepreneurs who would ac-
cept it and exert partial effort (approximate rather than exact because the contract has
to provide some positive rent to induce participation from those types that generate
positive expected social welfare, but not lower types). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 4 implies that it is optimal to offer at most two
contracts: one that induces only partial effort, and another that induces full effort
from some entrepreneur types. As explain in the proof of Proposition 4, the optimal
government contract that induces only partial effort is an approximate zero liability
contract. Suppose that the optimal contract that induces full effort from some entre-
preneur types is given by (b, r). The proof of Proposition 4 shows that if the expected
payoff to the entrepreneur under the contract (b, r), which is p(R  (1  b)(1+ r))  b,
is flatter than the expected payoff to the entrepreneur under the private market on the
interval
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

, then it follows that b = b.
Suppose that the expected payoff to the entrepreneur under the contract (b, r)
is steeper than the expected payoff to the entrepreneur under the private market on
the interval
h
cI
kR ,
1 cI
R(β k) +
1 b
βR

, i.e., R  (1  b)(1+ r) > kR. Denote the smallest type
that exerts full effort under (b, r) by p. Because public funds are costly, maximiz-
ing expected social welfare requires that (b, r) maximize the sum b+ p(1  b)(1+ r)
35
for types p  p and b + pk(1  b)(1+ r) for types p < p (i.e., minimize govern-
ment funding to induce those projects). This implies that (1   b)(1 + r) should be
increased so that the moral hazard constraint is binding at p, so (1   b)(1 + r) =
R  1p 1 cI1 k while b should be simultaneously increased so that b = b. Notice that, if
as (1  b)(1+ r) is increased the slope of the entrepreneur’s expected payoff under
(b, r) drops below kR then we are back in case 2 analysed in the proof of Proposition
4, where we already proved that b = b. 
Proof of Proposition 6. If the optimal menu consists of only one contract, the con-
clusion follows immediately. Now suppose that the optimal menu consists of two
contracts. Proposition 5 shows that the two contracts are a zero liability contract and
a maximum outlay contract (b, r). Because an entrepreneur who chooses the max-
imum outlay contract can exert either full or partial effort, his expected payoff is
maxfp(R   (1  b)(1+ r))   b, pk(R   (1  b)(1+ r)) + 1  b   cIg. If b + cI  1,
this maximum is larger than or equal to zero, which is the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff under the zero liability contract. Therefore, no entrepreneur would choose
the zero liability contract. Finally, Proposition 4 implies there is no need to consider
optimal menus with more than two contracts. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote the smallest (p, RH) type that exerts full effort under
the optimal menu of contracts by (pH, RH) and the contract chosen by this type be
(b, r). The argument used in the proof of Proposition 4 can be used to show that there
is no need for another contract in order to induce full effort from types (p, RH) such
that p > pH.
The contract (b, r) may also be picked by some types (p, RL). Denote the small-
est (p, RL) type that exerts full effort under (b, r) by (pL, RL). The argument used in
the proof of Proposition 4 implies that there is no need for another contract in order
to induce full effort from types (p, RL) such that p > pL. Hence, the only possible rea-
son for introducing another contract is in order to induce full effort from some types
(p, RL) such that p < pL.
However, the moral hazard constraint (equation (6) in the text) implies that, for
another contract (b0, r0) to induce full effort, it must be the case that (1  b0)(1+ r0) 
(1   b)(1 + r). This is ruled out by the incentive compatibility constraint, which
implies that (1  b(p))(1+ r(p)) is nonincreasing in p.
There is also no need for more than one contract to induce partial effort. The
government has to decide which is best: (1) to offer only one contract that extracts the
full rent from types (p, RL)who would exert partial effort under the first-best contract,
and allow types (p, RH) to capture a positive rent, or (2) to offer a different single con-
tract that extracts the full rent from types (p, RH) who would then exert partial effort,
and exclude types (p, RL). These are the only two contracts which ensure that types
(p, RL) get approximately zero rent, and any other contract that leaves them positive
rent is dominated by one of the above-mentioned contracts, since maximisation of
welfare involves minimisation of the rent to entrepreneurs. 
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